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REASONABLY ACCOMMODATING
NONMITIGATING PLAINTIFFS AFTER THE
ADA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008
Abstract: The passage of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 ("ADAAA")
has significantly changed the landscape of disability law in the United
States. Prior to the ADAAA, the Supreme Court narrowed the definition of
"disability" under the ADA in the landmark case Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc. Superseding Sutton, the ADAAA broadens the definition of "disability"
by indicating that measures used to successfully mitigate a plaintiff's im-
pairment may not be considered when determining whether a plaintiff is
"disabled." The ADAAA does not, however, expressly address plaintiffs who
fail to use these mitigating measures, and there has been confusion among
district courts on how to address these nonmitigating plaintiffs. Because
the ADAAA expands the definition of "disability," it will shift the focus of
many ADA cases to the subsequent determination of whether a plaintiff,
who could perform his job with or without a "reasonable accommodation,
is a "qualified individual" under the ADA. This Note proposes that a non-
mitigating plaintiff must establish that the burdens imposed on the plain-
tiff to mitigate the effects of his disability are not substantially less than the
burdens imposed on the employer to accommodate the plaintiffs disabil-
ity in order to show that an accommodation is reasonable. This proposal
screens out cases where a plaintiffs decision not to mitigate is plainly un-
reasonable, yet allows most nonmitigating plaintiffs to survive summary
judgment. In providing coverage in most cases, this proposal comports
with the spirit of ADAAA to broaden coverage under the ADA.
INTRODUCTION
On September 25, 2008, President George W. Bush signed into law
the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 ("ADAAA"). 1 The ADAAA was en-
acted to "restore the intent and protections of the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act of 1990" ("ADA"). 2 Title 1 of the 'ADA was.designed to pro-
tect against discrimination of a "qualified individual with a disability" in
I See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified at 29
U.S.C.S. § 705 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2009) and scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A. (West
2005 & Supp. 2B 2008)); Lawrence Lorber et al., Get Ready to Relearn the ADA: New Amend-
ments Will Change the Wor*place, LEGAL Timm, Oct 20, 2008, at 26.
2 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 122 Stat. at 3553; see also Joseph A. Seiner, Pleading
Disability, 51 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2010).
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the employment contexts A "qualified individual" is defined as "an in-
dividual ... who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can per-
form the essential functions of the employment position that such indi-
vidual holds or desires." 4 But the intended result of broad protection
for disabled individuals was curbed when the Supreme Court narrowly
interpreted the definition of "disability" in a series of cases in 1999 and
2002. 5
The most dramatic effect of these Supreme Court cases was that
individuals who commonly had been considered disabled were no
longer protected against discrimination under the ADA if they had suc-
cessfully ameliorated the symptoms of their impairment using medica-
tion or other assistive devices ("mitigating measures"). 6 Consider the
example of a person with epilepsy.? An epileptic suffers from seizures,
but medication {a mitigating measure) may reduce or nearly eliminate
the chance of seizures. 8 According to the Supreme Court's reasoning,
epileptics who successfully managed their epilepSy with medication
would no longer be considered "disabled."9
One of the most significant changes of the ADAAA was to reject
the holdings of the Supreme Court cases that had narrowed the scope
of coverage under the ADA by limiting the interpretation of "disabil-
ity." 10 By broadening the scope of "disability" in the ADAAA, Congress
has directed the focus of future litigation to whether an individual is a
"qualified individual"—the inquiry courts engage in after determining
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000) (amended 2008).
4 Id. § 12111 (8) .
5 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 2(a) (4)—(5), (b) (2), (b) (4)—(5), 122 Stat. at
3553-54; Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197-98 (2002), superseded
by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553; Albertson's,
Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1999), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553; Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527
U.S. 516, 521 (1999), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
325, 122 Stat. 3553; Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999), superseded by
statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
See Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 565-66; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521; Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
7 Epilepsy, as well as diabetes, is often used in scholarship as an example of a disability
that can be corrected by medication. See, e.g., NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, RIGHTING
THE ADA 45 (2009), available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications /2004/pdf/
righting_ada.pdf; Lorber et al., supra note 1 (using the example of diabetes).
8 See NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 7, at 45.
g See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482; NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 7, at 45.
1 ° See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 2(b) (2), (4), 122 Stat. at 3559.
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whether the plaintiff is "disabled." 11 Although "reasonable accommo-
dation" is a key element of determining if someone is a "qualified indi-
vidual," existing case law has provided little guidance on the definition,
and the ADAAA does not further define this term. 12 By significantly
expanding the definition of "disability," but not providing additional
clarification regarding the definition of "reasonable accommodation,"
Congress has effectively shifted the scope of future ADA claims gener-
ally toward the "qualified individual" inquiry, and specifically toward
the "reasonable accommodation" element." Because the ADAAA has
no retroactive language, it will likely be sonic time before courts have
the opportunity to interpret the new amendments."
It is unclear how courts should address plaintiffs who choose not
to use available mitigating measures ("nonmitigating plaintiffs"), be-
cause the Supreme Court only addressed mitigating plaintiffs, and be-
cause the ADAAA does not directly address this issue." An example of
a nonmitigating plaintiff is a diabetic who has not properly managed
his disease with medication." Neither the Supreme Court nor the cir-
cuit: courts of appeal haVe directly addressed whether such individuals
are "qualified individuals," but this issue will become more commonly
litigated in light of the recent amendments. 17 District court judges are
divided over whether nonmitigating plaintiffs can be afforded coverage
under the ADA." Some district court judges have concluded that plain-
tiffs who fail to avail themselves of available mitigating measures are not
covered under the ADA, reasoning that nonmitigating plaintiffs have a
legal duty to mitigate before they can seek protection under the ADA,"
II See Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act: As-
sessing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. Cou.oquv 217, 228 (2008),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/44/,
12 See id. at 228-29.
12 See id.
14 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 8, 122 Stat. at 3559.
15 See id. sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(E) (i), 122 Stat. at 3556; Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 565 (plaintiff's
brain subconsciously compensated for visual impairment); Murphy, 527 U.S: at 519-20
(plaintiff used blood pressure medication); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475 (plaintiffs used correc-
tive lenses).
16 See, e.g., NAT'L COUNCIL ON DtsAnnxre, supra note 7, at 45; Kimberly Atkins, New
LazoNanild Spur Spike in ADA Suits, MINN. LAW., Sept. 22, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR
18063864; Lorber el al., supra note 1.
17 See Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 565-66; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521; Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482;
Lorber et al., supra note 1.
18 See Sever v. Henderson, 381 F. Supp. 2d 405, 414-15 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (listing con-
flicting decisions regarding the issue), aff'd, 220 F. App'x 159 (3d Cir. 2007).
19 See id.
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Other district court judges have concluded that nonmitigating plain-
tiffs may be protected under the ADA."
This Note focuses on the "reasonable accommodation" element of
the "qualified individual" inquiry. 21 Specifically, this Note argues that
the determination of whether an "accommodation" is "reasonable"
should include consideration of the actions of the employee." For
nonmitigating plaintiffs, this means the plaintiff's decision not to miti-
gate must be taken into account." In order to show that an accommo-
dation is reasonable, the plaintiff should be required to establish that
the burdens imposed on the plaintiff to mitigate the effects of his dis-
ability are not substantially less than the burdens imposed on the em-
ployer to accommodate the plaintiff's disability, 24 This proposal pro-
vides courts that previously found a nonmitigating plaintiff not to be
"disabled" under the ADA an intellectually honest framework for evalu-
ating ADA protections for such individuals because this proposal is con-
sistent With the ADAAA and public policy."
Part 1 of this Note addresses the statutory basis for the interpreation
of the ADA. 26 Part II addresses the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the ADA. 27 Part III discusses the ADAAA and how it shifts the focus of
future inquiries to the "qualified individual" definition. 28 Part IV reviews
the different approaches that district court judges have used to address
nonmitigating plaintiffs and evaluates those approaches in light of the
ADAAA. 29 Part V proposes an analysis for addressing nonmitigating
plaintiffs after the ADAAA."
I, STATUTORY BASIS FOR INTERPRETING THE ADA
The ADA is designed to prevent discrimination against a "qualified
individual with a disability." 91 Prior to the ADAAA, most ADA case law
focused on the definition of "disability," and consequently, many cases
2° See id.
21 See infra notes 239-345 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 239-345 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 239-345 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 239-345 and accompanying text.
23 Sec infra notes 239-345 and accompanying text.
26 Sec infra notes 31-55 and accompanying text.
27, See infra notes 56-109 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 110-132 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 133-238 and accompanying text.
" Sec infra notes 239-345 and accompanying text.
31 42 § 12112(a) (2000) (amended 2008).
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were decided. on this issue alone." In order to show a prima facie case
of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that "(1) she is
disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) she is qualified to per-
form the essential functions of the job either with or without [reason-
able] accommodation and (3) she suffered an adverse employment
action because of her disability."" If the plaintiff meets her burden of
establishing a prima facie case, then the burden shifts to the defendant
to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. 34 If
the defendant meets that burden, then the plaintiff must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's proffered reasons
are only a pretext for the real discriminatory motive. 35
A. Definition of "Disability"
Prior to the ADAAA, "disability" was the key focus of most disability
discrimination cases under the ADA. 36 "Disability" was defined to in-
clude "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual."" Prior to the en-
actment of the ADAAA, the ADA did not define "physical or mental
impairment," "substantially limits," or "major life activities." 38 Conse-
quently, the definition of "disability" and its elements became the focus
of much of the litigation that followed the enactment of the ADA. 39
92 See Lorber et al., supra note 1.
99 Hooper v. Saint Rose Parish, 205 F. Supp, 2d 926, 928 (ND. Ili. 2002).
54 Hewitt v, Alcan Aluminum Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 183, 188 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (discuss-
ing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973), within the context of the
ADA).
99 Id.
32 See Lorber et al., supra note 1.
97 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000). The ADA provides three ways to meet the definition of
"disabled": "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C)
being regarded as having such an impairment." Id. This Note will not address the second
or third prongs of this definition. For a discussion of the effect of the ADAAA on these
prongs, see Long, supra note 11, at 223-25, 227.
514 Se e 42U.S.C. §§ 12102-12111,
" Sarah Shaw, Comment, Why Courts Cannot Deny ADA Protection to Plaintiffs Who Do Not
Use Available Mitigating Measures for Their Impairments, 90 CAL, L, REV, 1981, 1991-92
(2002). In addition, the text of the ADAAA reflects Congress's desire to shift the focus of
litigation away from the definition of "disability.* See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub.
L. No. 110-325, § 2(b) (5), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 note (West
2005 & Supp. 2B 2008)). For a discussion of the historical basis for the definition of 'dis-
ability" and why Congress was surprised by the significant ADA litigation over this term, see
Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., Restoring the ADA and Beyond: Disability in the 21st Century, 13 Ttx, J.
C.L. & C.R. 241, 256-58 (2008), and Restoring Congressional Intent and Protections Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearing on P.L. 101-36, Focusing on S. 1881 Before the S. Comm.
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Although the ADA did not define the elements of "disability," the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") issued regulations
establishing those definitions:40 The Supreme Court cast doubt on the
authority of the EEOC regulations to define "disability" and its ele-
men ts, 4 ' but the ADAAA has now clarified that the EEOC has authority
to define these terms. 42
The EEOC previously defined a "physical or mental impairment"
as lalny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement,
or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems"
or "[a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation,
organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific
learning disabilities." The EEOC defined "substantially limits" as
"[u] nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the
general population can perform" or "[s]ignificantly restricted as to the
condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform
a particular major life activity as compared to ... [an] average person
in the general population ...." 44 Finally, the EEOC defined a "major
life activity" as "functions such as caring for oneself, performing man-
ual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working."45 These definitions were designed to fulfill the purpose of
the ADA "to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards
addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 46
B. Definition of "Qualified Individual" and "Reasonable Accommodation"
In addition to proving that he is "disabled," a plaintiff must also
prove that lie is a "qualified individual" within the meaning of the
ADA. 47 The ADA defined a "qualified individual" as "an individual .. .
on Health, Education, Labor, E.g .' Pensions, 110th Cong. 5-9 (2007) (written testimony of Chai
R. Feldblum, Professor of Law & Director, Federal Legislation Clinic, Georgetown University
Law Center), available at http://help.senate.gov/Hearings/2007_11_15_b/Feldblum.pdf.
4° See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102-12111; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)-(j) (2008), superseded by statute,
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
'I Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1999), superseded by statute,
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553. The Supreme Court
noted that although the EEOC was given authority by Congress to issue implementing
regulations for much of the ADA, it was not given explicit authority to issue regulations
interpreting the term "disability." See id. at 978-79.
42 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 6(a) (2), tit. V, § 506, 122 Stat. at 3558.
4' 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h).
44 Id. § 1630.2( j) (i)-(ii).
45 Id. § 1630.2( i) .
46 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2).
47 /d. § 12112(9).
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who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the es-
sential functions of the employment position that such individual holds
or desires."48 "Reasonable accommodation" was not defined in the
ADA, but rather illustrated by a non-exhaustive list. 49 Possible reason-
able accommodations included "making existing facilities used by em-
ployees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities"
and "job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reas-
signment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equip-
ment or devices ... and other similar accommodations for individuals
with disabilities." 5° For example, an employee with diabetes may re-
quest a lunch break at a regularly scheduled time each day to monitor
her blood sugar levels as a reasonable accommodation. 51
The definition of "reasonable accommodation" is relevant not only
as an element of the definition of "qualified individual," but also be-
cause the failure of an employer to provide a reasonable accommoda-
tion may itself be a ground for liability for discrimination. 52 The ADA
allows an employer to refuse to provide a "reasonable accommodation"
if the employer can show that the accommodation would impose an
"undue hardship" on the employer's business." An "undue hardship"
is defined by the ADA as "an action requiring significant difficulty or
expense." 54 Some plaintiffs have argued that the only limitation on
whether an "accommodation" is "reasonable" is whether it poses an
"undue hardship" on the employer, but the Supreme Court refuted.this
proposition . 55
48 /d. § 12111(8).
•	 49 Id. § 12111(9).
50 Id.
51 See, e.g., Nawrot v. CPC Intl, 277 F.3d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 2002) (employee with diabe-
tes requested frequent, short breaks to monitor blood sugar).
52 42 U.S.C.A. §12112(b)(5)(A) (West 2005 	 Supp. 2B 2008). The ADAAA only
makes very minor changes to this section of the ADA. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec. 5(a), § 102(a)—(b), 122 Stat, at 3557; id. sec. 6(a) (2), tit. V, § 506,
122 Stat. at 3558.
53 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
54 Id. § 12111(10) (A). The ADAAA only makes very minor changes to this section of
the ADA. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 6, § 506, 122 Stat. at 3558. The ADA pro-
vides a number of factors that should be considered to determine whether an accommoda-
tion would pose an undue hardship, such as the cost of the accommodation, the financial
resources of the employer, and the impact of the accommodation on business operations.
See 42 U .S.C.A. § 12111(10)(B).
55 See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 399-400 (2002); see also infra notes 91-
108 and accompanying text.
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H. THE SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE ADA
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the ADA has had a pro-
found influence on the treatment of mitigating plaintiffs, and, indi-
rectly, on the treatment of nonmitigating plain tiffs. 56 The Court has
provided guidance regarding the treatment of mitigating plaintiffs on
the "disability" definition, but no direct guidance on the treatment of
nonmitigating plaintiffs. 57 In addition, the Court has provided only lim-
ited guidance on the definition of "reasonable accommodation." 58
A. The Supreme Court Narrowly Defines "Disability" in
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.
The steps taken by the Supreme Court prior to the ADAAA are
important to understanding why the ADAAA was passed and ascertain-
ing what impact it will have." In the years following the enactment of
the ADA, a circuit split arose over the treatment of mitigating measures
in the consideration of the definition of "disability."6° Specifically, cir-
cuit courts disagreed about whether mitigating measures used by a
plaintiff should be taken into account when determining whether a
plaintiff was "substantially limited" under the ADA definition of "dis-
ability."61 In 1999, the Supreme Court addressed this issue in a trilogy
of cases decided on the same day. 62 The result in the lead case, Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., and its companion cases was to narrow the defini-
tion of "disability" by taking into account mitigating measures when
determining whether an individual was "substantially limited" in a "ma-
jor life activity." 63
56 See, e.g., Williams v. Thresholds, Inc., No. 02 C 9101, 2003 WL 22232835, at *5 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 22, 2003); Hooper v. Saint Rose Parish, 205 F. Supp. 2d 926, 929 (N.D. III. 2002);
Finical v. Collections Unlimited, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1037-38 (D. Ariz. 1999).
57 See Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1999) (plaintiff's brain
subconsciously compensated for visual impairment), superseded by statute, ADA Amend-
ments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553; Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999) (plaintiff used blood pressure medication), superseded by statute,
ADA Amendments Act of 2008. Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553; Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (plaintiffs used corrective lenses), superseded by statute,
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
58 See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 400-02 (2002); Long, supra note 11, at
228.
58 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 2(a)-(b), 122 Stat. at 3553-54.
6° Sutton, 527 U.S. at 477.
61 Id.
62 Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 565-66; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521; Sutton, 527 U.S. at 477.
63 See Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 565; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521; Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482. In
Murphy, the Court held that an employee's high blood pressure did not substantially limit
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In Sutton, severely myopic twin sisters applied to United Air Lines
for employment as commercial airline pilots. 64 Each sister had uncor-
rected visual acuity of 20/200 or worse in the right eye and 20/400 or
worse in the left eye. 65 After using corrective lenses, each attained vi-
sion of 20/20 or better.° The airline declined to offer either sister em-
ployment due to their failure to meet the company's minimum visual
acuity requirement of 20/100 or better uncorrected. 67 The sisters sued
United under the ADA, arguing that they were discriminated against
on the basis of their disability, because they met United's visual re-
quirement after using mitigating measures—namely, corrective
lenses. 68
The Sutton Court concluded that "if a person is taking measures to
correct for, or mitigate, a physical or mental impairment, the effects of
those measures—both positive and negative—must be taken into ac-
count when judging whether that person is 'substantially limited' in a
major life activity and thus 'disabled' under the Act." 69 Because the
plaintiffs in Sutton used corrective lenses (mitigating measures) to cor-
his major life activities when he was medicated. 527 U.S. at 521. Referencing its decision in
Sutton, the Court said that the same rule applied: the determination of whether an indi-
vidual is substantially limited must be made with reference to the mitigating measures he
uses. Id. Because the plaintiff used blood pressure medication that effectively managed his
high blood pressure, he was not considered "disabled." Id.
In Atbertson's, the plaintiff was fired from his job as a truck driver after his employer
determined that the plaintiff failed to meet the basic Department of Transportation visual
standard. 527 U.S. at 560. Weak vision in one eye left the plaintiff with the effect of mo-
nocular vision. Id. at 559. Evidence demonstrated that the plaintiff's body had developed
subconscious mechanisms to compensate for this visual impairment. Id. at 565. The Court
concluded that it could find "no principled basis for distinguishing between measures
undertaken with artificial aids, like medications and devices, and measures undertaken,
whether consciously or not, with the body's own systems." Id. at 565-66. Thus, this case
stands for the proposition that even mitigating measures resulting from the body's own
compensation will be considered. See id.
In 2002, the Supreme Court further narrowed the scope of "substantially limits" in
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197-98 (2002). The Court
concluded that the phrases "substantially limited" and "major life activities" needed to be
"interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled" in order to
prevent the ADA from classifying more individuals than Congress intended with its finding
that 43 million Americans have disabilities. See id. The Court concluded that in order to be
substantially limited in a major life activity, an individual must be impaired in such a way
that "prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central
importance to most people's daily lives." Id. at 198.
°1 527 U.S. at 475.
65 Id.
" Id.
67 Id. at 476.
69 Id.
69 527 U.S. at 482.
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rect their vision, the Court considered the plaintiffs in their actual,
mitigated states when determining whether the plaintiffs were "substan-
tially limited" in any "major life activity."" Because the plaintiffs' vision
was fully corrected when using their corrective lenses, the Court held
that they were not "substantially limited" in any major life activity and
therefore not "disabled."
Although the Court's conclusion was at odds with ADA legislative
history, the Court determined that the statute was unambiguous, and
therefore there was no need to consider legislative history." The Court
instead reached its decision based on three separate provisions of the
text of the ADA." First, the Court explained that the phrase "substan-
tially limits" appeared in the present indicative verb form. 74 The Court
concluded that this required that the person be presently substantially
limited, rather than potentially or hypothetically substantially limited . 75
The Court stated that "[a] 'disability' exists only where an impairment
'substantially limits' a major life activity, not where it 'might,' 'could,' or
'would' be substantially limiting if mitigating measures were not taken."'"
Second, the Court considered that the definition of "disability" re-
quires that disabilities be evaluated "with respect to an individual." 77
The Court concluded that whether an individual has a "disability" there-
fore necessitates an individualized inquiry." The Court determined that
evaluating a plaintiff in a hypothetical unmitigated state would require
viewing individuals with the same condition as part of a group, rather
than as individuals." According to the Court, treating persons as mem-
bers of a group of people with similar impairments, rather than as indi-
viduals, was contrary to the purpose of the ADA. 8°
Finally, the Court placed great emphasis on a congressional finding
that 43 million Americans have a disability. 81 The Court considered vari-
ous other sources for the estimated number of disabled Americans and
concluded that allowing plaintiffs to be considered in their unmitigated
7° See id. at 488-89.
71 Id.
72 See id. at 482; id. at 499-502 (Stevens.,]., dissenting).
73 Id.
74 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 483.
76 Id.
76 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483-84.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 984.
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states would dramatically raise the number of disabled individuals. 82
The Court concluded that Congress therefore intended courts to con-
sider plaintiffs in their mitigated states when determining whether they
were "substantially limited."83 As a result, the Court narrowed the scope
of ADA coverage for mitigating plaintiffs like the myopic sisters in Sitt-
ton.84 As discussed later in this Note, the holding and underlying reason-
ing in Sutton have been used by many district court judges to address the
proper treatment of nonmitigating plaintiffs under the ADA. 83
B. The Supreme Court's Limited Guidance on "Reasonable Accommodation" in
US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett
The determination of whether an individual is a "qualified indi-
vidual" under the ADA includes a determination of whether the plain-
tiff could perform the essential aspects of the job with the use of a "rea-
sonable accommodation."86 The employer is obligated to provide such
an accommodation unless doing so would impose an "undue hardship"
on the employer's business. 87 The ADA does not provide a clear defini-
tion for "reasonable accommodation," but rather illustrates it with ex-
amples of how an employer can accommodate a disabled employee. 88
Consequently, interpretation of the term has been largely left open to
judicial determin ation . 89
Although the Supreme Court has provided significant guidance on
the interpretation of "disability" in Sutton and other cases, 99 it has pro-
vided only basic guidance regarding the definition of "reasonable ac-
commodation."91 One of the few cases to address this issue is US Air-
ways, Inc. v. Barnett. 92 In Barnett, the plaintiff suffered a back injury and
used his seniority to transfer to a less physically demanding mailroom
position. 93 The plaintiff asked for a reasonable accommodation to re-
main in that position after learning that more senior employees in-
82 Id. at 484-87.
0 Id. at 487.
84 See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475.
65 See infra notes 133-195 and accompanying text.
86 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000) (amended 2008).
87 See id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
88 Id. § 12111(9).
89 See Long, supra note 11, at 228.
9° See Sutton, 527 . U.S. at 482; see also Toyota Motor, 534 U.S. at 197-98; Albertson's, 527
U.S. at 565-66; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521.
91 See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 400-02; Long, supra note 11, at 228.
82 See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 400-02; Long, supra note 11, at 228.
98 535 U.S. at 394.
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tended to bid on the position. 94 The defendant denied the request,
and the employee sued under the ADA. 95 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine whether a requested accommodation may
trump a seniority system." The Court concluded that if a requested
accommodation conflicts with a seniority system, then the accommoda-
tion is ordinarily presumed not to be "reasonable." 97
The reasoning behind the decision in Barnett sheds some light on
the proper way to interpret "reasonable accommodation" in the context
of nonmitigating plaintiffs." The plaintiff in Barnett argued that "rea-
sonable accommodation" meant only "effective accommodation." 99 Re-
jecting this argument, the Court indicated that "reasonable" does not
mean "effective" in ordinary English.'" Furthermore, the Court noted
that the word "accommodation," not the word "reasonable," conveys the
need for effectiveness.m The Court also indicated that "reasonable ac-
commodation" is not a mirror image of "undue hardship."102 Noting
that "undue hardship" focuses on "the operation of the business," the
Court stated that an effective accommodation could prove unreasonable
because of its impact on factors other than business operations, such as
its impact on fellow employees.'"
The Court also expressed its approval for the manner in which
lower courts have reconciled the terms "reasonable accommodation"
and "undue hardship" with a practical burden test.'" In order to defeat
a defendant's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff "need only
show that an 'accommodation' seems reasonable on its face, i.e., ordi-
narily or in the run of cases."'" After the plaintiff has made this show-
ing, the defendant "must show special (typically case-specific) circum-
stances that demonstrate undue hardship in the particular circum-
stances."'"
Barnett demonstrates that proving the existence of an undue hard-
ship on the employer's business operations is not the only limitation on
95 Id.
95 Id.
98 Id. at 393-94.
97 Id. at 394. An employee may present evidence to refute this presumption. Id.
" See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 400-01.
99 Id. at 399.
100 Id. at 400.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 400-01.
104 Id. at 401.
1 °' Id.
106 Id. at 402.
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a requested accommodation's reasonableness."7 Rather, factors other
than the potential detrimental impact on the employer's business may
be considered when determining whether an "accommodation" is "rea-
sonable.""B As this Note argues in Part V, courts should consider the
plaintiffs decision not to mitigate as one of those factors."B
ADAAA SHIFTS FOCUS FROM "DISABILITY" TO "REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION"
A. ADAAA Expands the Definition of "Disability"
The most obvious effect of the ADAAA is to dramatically expand
the scope of the definition of "disability."'" The ADAAA leaves essen-
tially unchanged the actual definition of the first prong of "disability":
"a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities of such individual"m Despite keeping the same
definition for "disability," the ADAAA expands the interpretation of the
definition of the,elements of disability; this interpretation in turn ex-
pands the scope of "disability." 112 This expansion is consistent with the
107 See id. at 400-01.
108 See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 400-01; see also Shaw, supra note 39, at 2036 n.333 ("On dif-
ferent facts, the Court might expand its description of the reasonableness analysis to in-
clude other considerations.").
I" See infra 239-345 and accompanying text.
IN See Long, supra note 11, at 218-19.
111 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec. 4(a), § 3(1)(A), 122 Stat,
3553, 3555 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(1)(A) (West 2005 & Supp. 2B 2008)); Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (A) (2000) (amended 2008). The original
ADA language included one or more of the major life activities." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (A)
(emphasis added).
112 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 2(b), 122 Stat. at 3554. Congress also indi-
cated that the EEOC definition of "substantially limits" as "significantly restricted" expresses a
higher standard than that intended by Congress. Id. sec. 2(a) (8), 122 Stu. at 3554; 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(j) (ii) (2008). The ADAAA expressly indicates that the EEOC should revise its regu-
lations to modify the definitions for these terms to make them consistent with the statute.
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 2(b) (6), 122 Stat. at 3554. As of the publicatiOn of this
Note, the EEOC has not yet made these requested changes. See id.; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (ii).
In addition, the ADAAA also expands the definition of "major life activities" to include
"operation of a major bodily function, including but not limited to, functions of the im-
mune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respira-
tory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.' ADA Amendments Act of 2008,
sec. 4(a), § 3(2) (B), 122 Stat. at 3555. Both of these changes expand the definition of "dis-
ability." See Long, supra note 11, at 218-20.
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ADAAA's stated desire to provide "broad coverage" under the ADA to
the maximum extent permitted by the amendments. 115
One major change addressed in the ADAAA is the rejection of Sut-
ton's holding that mitigating measures must be considered when de-
termining whether an impairment "substantially limits a major life ac-
tivity:414 The ADAAA provides that "Nile determination of whether an
impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be made with-
out regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures ...." 115
This means that if a judge considers whether a plaintiff who has suc-
cessfully managed his epilepsy with medication is "disabled," the judge
will have to speculate on the extent of the plaintiff's impairment as if
he was not using medication. 116 The ADAAA therefore allows for specu-
lation about a plaintiffs unmitigated state even when that plaintiff ac-
tually mitigates. 117
On its face, the ADAAA arguably prevents consideration of mitigat-
ing measures whether the plaintiff mitigates or not. 118 The ADAAA's
legislative history, however, shows that mitigating measures are in-
tended to be excluded from consideration by courts only in situations
where the plaintiff has actually mitigated. 116 The relevant committee
reports and floor debates demonstrate that legislators were concerned
about the catch-22 situation that arose when mitigating plaintiffs were
so successful in managing their disabilities that they were not "substan-
" 5 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 4(a), § 3(4) (A), 122 Stat. at 3555 ("The defi-
nition of disability in this Act shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals
under this Act, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this Act.").
114 Id. sec. 2(b) (2), 122 Stat. at 3554; id. sec. 4(a), § 3(4) (E), 122 Stat. at 3556; Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1999).
115 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec, 4(a), § 3(4) (E)(i), 122 Stat. at 3556.
116
 See id.
117 See id. Another change made in the ADAAA is to reject the standard set forth in Toy-
ota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams that "substantially limits" means that an
impairment must "prevent[] or severely restrict[] the individual from doing activities that
are of central importance to most people's daily lives." Id. sec. 2(b) (4), 122 Stat. at 3554
(quoting Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002), superseded by
statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553). Congress also
rejected Toyota Motor's declaration that the terms must be "'interpreted strictly to create a
demanding standard for qualifying as disabled.'" Id. sec. 2(b) (4), 122 Stat. at 3554 (quot- .
big Toyota Motor, 534 U.S. at 197). Congress concluded that the effect of these standards
outlined in Toyota Motor was to reduce the broad scope of coverage intended to be avail-
able tinder the ADA. Id. sec. 2(b) (4), 122 Stat, at 3554. Like those in Sutton, the Toyota
Motor standards narrowed the broad definition of "disability" that Congress had intended.
See id. sec. 2(a) (4)—(5), 122 Stat, at 3553; Toyota Motor, 534 U.S. at 197-98.
179 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 4(a), § 3(4) (E) (i), 122 Stat, at 3556.
119 See H.R. REP. No. 110-730, pt. 1, at 15-16 (2008); id. pt. 2, at 10; 154 CONG, REC.
S8346 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008) (statement of the managers).
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tially limited" under Sution. 12° Those plaintiffs were discriminated
against because of their impairments, but they were not disabled
enough to get ADA protection. 121 For example, the House of Repre-
sentatives Committee on Education and Labor Report gave examples
of five cases that would be decided differently if considered after over-
turning Sutton. 122 In all of the five cases, the plaintiffs who were denied
coverage had mitigated their impairments.'" F
At no time did legislators indicate any concern for nonmitigating
plaintiffs being denied coverage. 124 In fact, testimony was given that
disapproved of the incentives that Sutton gave for plaintiffs not to mid-
gate. 125 As Cheryl Sensenbrenner, Chairman of the American Associa-
tion of People with Disabilities, stated, "[T] he last message we would
want to send to Americans with disabilities ... is the less you manage
your disability, the less you try, the more likely you are to be protected
under civil rights laws." 126 The ADAAA, thus, is designed to prevent the
consideration of mitigating measures in the determination of "disabil-
ity" for mitigating plaintiffs only. 127
B. ADAAA Shifts Spotlight to "Reasonable Accommodation"
Although the ADAAA does not address the definition of "reason-
able accommodation," it nonetheless shifts the focus of post-amend-
ment case law to analysis of that term. 128 In an ADA claim, the plaintiff
must first prove that he is "disabled," then prove that he is a "qualified
individual" under the ADA. 129 The ADAAA substantially broadens the
scope of the definition of "disability," so many more cases will survive
summary judgment on that initial element of a plaintiff's prima facie
case.'" Because the definition of "disability" has been dramatically ex-
panded by the ADAAA, the next issue plaintiffs must prove is that they
satisfy the requirements of a "qualified individual," which includes the
10 See H.R. REP. No. 110-730, pt. 1, at 15-16; id. pt. 2, at 10; 159 CONG. Rec. S7957
(daily ed. July 31, 2008) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
121 See H.R. REP. No. 110-730, pt. 1, at 15-16; id. pt. 2, at 10; 154 CONG. REC. 57957 .
(daily ed. July 31, 2008) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
122 See H.R. REP. No. 110-730, pt. 1, at 15-16.
120 See id.
124 See generally id.
125 See id. pt. 2, at 10.
126 Id.
127 See H.R. REP. No. 110-730, pt. 2, at 10.
128 See Long, supra note 11, at 228.
122 See Hooper v. Saint Rose Parish, 205 F. Supp. 2d 926,928 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
aw See Long, supra note 11, at 228.
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element of "reasonable accommodation." 31 'Because there is less guid-
ance from Congress and the judiciary on the determination of "reason-
able accommodation," its definition will become a key issue in future
ADA cases. 132
IV. TREATMENT OF NONMITIGATING PLAINTIFFS BEFORE AND AI I ER
THE ADAAA
Many courts attempting to address the proper treatment of non-
mitigating plaintiffs before the ADAAA relied heavily on the Supreme
Court's 1999 decision in Sutton. v United Air Lines, Inc.'" The holding in
Sutton applied to plaintiffs who, used mitigating measures, like the my-
opic sisters in that case, but it did not directly address the proper
treatment of nonmitigating plaintiffs. 134 After Sutton, lower courts have
exhibited substantial confusion regarding the proper treatment of
nonmitigating plaintiffs under the ADA. 133 Although circuit courts of
appeals have yet to directly address this issue, numerous federal district
court judges have done so, with conflicting results. 136 District court
judges have approached this issue in one of two ways, referred to in this
Note as the "Prohibition on Speculation" approach and the "Duty to
Mitigate" approach. 137 This Note synthesizes these approaches and
their underlying analyses in this way for the first time.'" Each of these
approaches fails after the ADAAA, and a new approach must be estab-
lished. 139
A. Prohibition on Speculation Approach
The judges who follow the Prohibition on Speculation approach
conclude that Sutton prohibits speculation, so nonmitigating plaintiffs
See id.
132 See id.
133 See, e.g., Williams v. Thresholds, Inc., No. 02 C 9101, 2003 WL 22232835, at *5 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 22, 2003); Hooper v. Saint Rose Parish, 205 F. Supp. 2d 926, 929 (N.D. Ill. 2002);
Finical v. Collections Unlimited, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1037-38 (D. Ariz. 1999); see also
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 971, 482-83 (1999), superseded by statute, ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
134 See 527 U.S. at 482.
133 See Sever v. Henderson, 381 F. Su pp. 2d 405, 414-15 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (listing con-
flicting decisions regarding the issue), aff'd, 220 F. App'x 159 (3d Cir. 2007).
135
 See id.
137
 See id. •
198 See infra notes 140-223 and accompanying text.
139 See infra notes 156-165, 191-195, 220-223 and accompanying text.
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must be considered in their unmitigated states. 14° The Court in Sutton
stressed that the ADA requires an individualized inquiry; so mitigating
individuals must be viewed in their actual mitigated states, and there-
fore a court cannot speculate as to a plaintiffs hypothetical unmiti-
gated state. 141 The Court also stated that "[a] 'disability' exists only
where an impairment 'substantially limits' a major life activity, not
where it `might,' 'could,' or 'would' be substantially limiting if mitigat-
ing measures were not taken." 142 Although the holding in Sutton does
not directly apply to nonmitigating plaintiffs,'" judges employing the
Prohibition on Speculation approach reason that Sutton. requires even
nonmitigating plaintiffs to be viewed in their actual (unmitigated)
states. 144 In essence, this approach indicates that a court cannot evalu-
ate a nonmitigating plaintiffs disability by guessing how mitigating
measures would impact the nonmitigating plaintiffs condition. 145 As a
result, nonmitigating plaintiffs are more likely to fall within the ADA's
scope of protection. 146 This approach has been followed by some dis-
trict court judges in the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. 147
For example, in Williams v. Thresholds, Inc., the judge considered a
plaintiff who suffered from sarcoidosis, a chronic disorder of unknown
cause.'" The plaintiff initially refused to take prednisone as recom-
mended by his physician. 149 The defendant argued that the plaintiff
did not have a "disability" because, when he later took prednisone, it
helped his symptoms. 150 The judge disagreed, citing Sutton for the
proposition that courts should not speculate as to whether treatment
not used by plaintiffs would have relieved their symptoms.'"
148 See, e.g., Williams, 2003 WL 22232835, at *5; Capizzi v. County of Placer, 135 F. Supp.
2d 1105, 1113 (E.D. Cal. 2001); Finical, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 1038.
141 527 U.S. at 482-83.
:42 Id. at 482.
	 '
148 See id.
144 See, e.g.. Williams, 2003 WL. 22232835, at *5; Capizzi, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 1113; Finical,
65 F. Supp. 2d at 1038.
I+5 See, e.g., Williams, 2003 W1. 22232835, at *5; Capizzi, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 1113; Finical,
65 F. Supp. 2d at 1038.
145 See, e.g., Williams, 2003 WL. 22232835. at *5; Capizzi, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 1113; Finical,
65 F. Supp. 2d at 1038.
147 See, e.g., EEOC Centura Health Corp., No. 05-cv-01826-WDM-MJW, 2007 WL
2788836, at *3 (D. Colo. Sept. 21, 2007); Williams, 2003 WL 22232835, at *5; Capizzi, 135 F.
Supp. 2d at 1113.
148 2003 WL 22232835, at *1.
1491d.
15° Id. at *5.
151 Id.
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in Finical v. Collections Unlimited, Inc., the judge concluded
that nonmitigating plaintiffs must be considered in their actual, unmiti-
gated states.'" In Finical, a hearing-impaired plaintiff refused to wear a
hearing aid.'" The defendant argued that the plaintiff was not "sub-
stantially limited" when mitigating measures—namely, the use of a hear-
ing aid—were considered. 154 The judge disagreed, indicating that focus-
ing on whether the plaintiff would be "substantially limited" if she used
a hearing aid was speculative and therefore prohibited by Sutton. t55
The Prohibition on Speculation approach enables judges to reach
a conclusion regarding how to treat nonmitigating plaintiffs that is con-
sistent with the text of the ADAAA. 156 The conclusion resulting from
the Prohibition on Speculation approach is that nonmitigating plain-
tiffs must be viewed in their unmitigated states for the determination of
"disability." 157 This conclusion is consistent with the ADAAA because
the amendments state that mitigating measures may not be taken into
account in the determination of "disability:158
The Prohibition on Speculation approach, however, allows judges
to base their conclusion on reasoning inconsistent with the ADAAA. 159
The reasoning underlying the Prohibition on Speculation approach is
based on the theory that Sutton prohibits any speculation about a plain-
tiff's condition, so the plaintiff must be considered in his actual state. ' 6°
The ADAAA, however, explicitly overturns Sutton's holding that mitigat-
ing plaintiffs must be viewed in their mitigated states and instead pro-
vides that the determination of "disability" must be made without refer-
ence to mitigating measures.' 61 In doing so, the ADAAA also implicitly
rejects Sutton's prohibition on speculation because requiring courts to
consider mitigating plaintiffs in their unmitigated states necessarily re-
152 65 F. Supp. 2d at 1037-38.
03 Id. at 1037.
154 Id.
"B Id. at 1037-38.
"6 See, e.g., Williams, 2003 WI. 22232835, at *5; Capizzi, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 1113; Finical,
65 F. Supp. 2d at 1038; see also ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec.
4(a); § 3(4) (E) (1), 122 Stat. 3553, 3556 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(4) (E) (i) (West
2005 & Supp. 2B 2008)).
157 See, e.g., Williams, 2003 WL 22232835, at *5; Capizzi, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 1113; Finical,
65 F. Supp. 2d at 1038.
"B See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 4(a), § 3 (4) (E) (1), 122 Stat. at 3556.
159 See id.; see also Williams, 2003 WL 22232835, at *5; Capizzi, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 1113;
Finical, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 1038.
159 See, e.g., Williams, 2003 WL 22232835, at *5; Capizzi, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 1113; Finical,
65 F. Supp. 2d at 1038.
161 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 2(b)(2), 122 Stat. at 3554; id. sec. 4(a),
§ 3(4) (E) (i), 122 Stat. at 3556.
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quires courts to speculate about how severe a plaintiffs symptoms
would be if they were hypothetically not mitigated. 162 The ADAAA thus
requires the courts to speculate, which is inconsistent with the founda-
tional reasoning of the Prohibition on Speculation approach)"
Consequently, although the conclusion of the Prohibition on
Speculation approach is consistent with the the text of ADAAA, its rea-
soning is not, so a new proposal is needed. 164 Furthermore, considering
the effect of the ADAAA to shift the focus from "disability" to. "qualified
individual," this approach does nothing to shed light on how these
courts should address the determination of the "qualified individual"
analysis with respect to nonmitigating plaintiffs. 165
B. Duty to Mitigate Approach
Under the Duty to Mitigate approach, district court judges con-
clude that nonmitigating plaintiffs have a duty to mitigate their im-
pairments; these plaintiffs are thus less likely to be protected by the
ADA. 166 The courts that follow the Duty to Mitigate approach tend to
rely on one or both of two lines of reasoning, 167 each of which stems
from the misconstrued understanding of a particular case's holding. 168
One line of reasoning broadens the holding of Sutton to conclude that
nonmitigating plaintiffs are not "substantially limited" if their impair-
ments can be corrected by mitigating measures. 169 The other line of
reasoning, which stems from the misinterpretation of case law by the
judge in Tangires, has led many judges to conclude that a nonmitigating
plaintiff who has not used available treatment to mitigate his condition
162 See id. sec. 4(a), § 3(4) (E) (i), 122 Stat. at 3556; Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482-83.
163 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 4(a), § 3(4) (E) (i), 122 Stat. at 3556; Sutton,
527 U.S. at 482-83; sec also Williams, 2003 WL 22232835, at *5; Capizzi, 135 F. Supp. 2d at
1113; Finical, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 1038.
164
 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 4(a), § 3(4) (E) (i), 122 Stat. at 3556; see also
Williams, 2003 WL 22232835, at *5; Capizzi, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 1113; Finical, 65 F. Supp. 2d
at 1038.
166 See Long, supra note 11, at 228; see also Williams, 2003 WL 22232835, at *5; Capizzi,
135 F. Supp. 2d at 1113; Finical, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 1038.
166 See, e.g., Hooper, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 929; Mont-Ros v. City of W Miami, 111 F. Supp.
2d 1338, 1356-57 (S.D. Fla. 2000); Tangires v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 79 F. Supp. 2d 587,
596 (D. Md. 2000), aff'd, 230 F.3d 1354 (4th Cir. 2000).
167 See, e.g., Hooper, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 929; Mont-Ros, Ill F. Supp. 2d at 1356-57; Tan-
gires, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 596.
169 See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482; Roberts v. County of Fairfax, Va., 937 F. Supp. 541, 548
(E.D. Va. 1996).
169 See Monterroso v. Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP, 591 F. Supp. 2d 567, 578 (S.D.N.Y.
2008); Hooper, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 929; Mont-Ros, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 1356-57; see also Sutton,
527 U.S. at 482.
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is not a "qualified incliNidual." 170
 As a result of the conflict with the lan-
guage of the ADAAA or flawed reasoning, courts should not use either
analysis underlying the Duty to Mitigate approach after the ADAAA. 171
In addition, the language of some Duty to Mitigate cases suggests
that the judges who followed this approach simply felt that the non-
mitigating plaintiffs decision not to mitigate was unreasonable. 172 After
deciding the ends desired—that nonmitigating plaintiffs should not be
afforded protection under the ADA—these judges simply adopted rea-
soning to meet those ends.' 73 This suggests these judges thought there
were public policy reasons for denying ADA coverage to plaintiffs who
do not mitigate. 174
1. Broadening-of-Sutton Analysis
Some courts have justified the Duty to Mitigate approach by
broadening the holding of Sutton. 175 The holding of Sutton indicates
that if a plaintiff uses mitigating measures, the effect of those mitigating
measures must be considered when determining whether a plaintiff is
"substantially limited in a major life activity."' 76 Courts following this
broadening-of-Sutton analysis have incorrectly extended the holding of
Sutton to stand for the proposition that if mitigating measures could cor-
rect the nonmitigating plaintiff's disability, the plaintiff is not "substan-
tially limited," and therefore not "disabled," because the plaintiff did
not use those mitigating measures. 177 Rather than applying Sutton only
when the plaintiff actually uses mitigating measures, these courts are
applying Sutton if the nonmitigating plaintiff could have used effective
mitigating measures. 178 The result of this subtle, but significant, broad-
ening of Sutton is that nonmitigating plaintiffs have been denied cover-
170 See Gibbon v. City of New York, No. 07 Civ. 6698(NRB), 2008 WL 5068966, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2008); Hewitt v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 183, 189
(N.D.N.Y 2001); see also Tangires, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 596.
171 See infra notes 175-223 and accompanying text.
177 See infra notes 224-238 and accompanying text.
178 See infra notes 224-238 and accompanying text.
174 See infra notes 224-238 and accompanying text.
175 See, e.g., Monteriaso, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 578; Hooper, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 929; Mont-Ros,
111 F. Supp. 2d at 1356-57; see also Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
176
 527 U.S. at 482.
177 See id.; see also Monterroso, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 578; Hooper, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 929;
Mont-Ros, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 1356-57.
178 See Monterroso, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 578; Hooper, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 929; Mont-Ros, 111
F. Supp. 2d at 1356-57; see also Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
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age under the ADA more frequently. 179 As many judges who follow the
Prohibition on Speculation approach have noted, this view miscon-
strues the reasoning of Sutton because it permits speculation about the
effect of mitigating measures not used by a plaintiff. 18° The broaden-
ing-of-Sutton analysis has been followed by some district court judges in
the Second, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. 181
In Hooper v. Saint Rose Parish, a district court judge concluded that
when a plaintiff's impairment can be treated by mitigating measures,
those mitigating measures must be taken into account when deciding if
the plaintiff has a "disability." 182 The judge cited Sutton for this rule,
even though Sutton only directly applies to mitigating plaintiffs. 183 The
plaintiff in Hooper had a voice impairment that limited her ability to
speak normally. 184 The court was presented with evidence that Botox
injections would have alleviated the plaintiffs symptoms, yet the plain-
tiff "inexplicably" did not use this treatment. 185 Concluding that the
plaintiff's symptoms would have been alleviated by the use of Botox
injections, the court held that the plaintiff was not "substantially lim-
ited" in the major life activity of talking, and therefore not "dis-
abled."188
In Mont-Ros v. City of West Miami, a district court judge concluded
that a police officer who failed to treat his sleep apnea was not "sub-
stan daily limited in a major life activity." 187 The plaintiff did not use
mitigating measures, but his physicians testified that various measures
could have been used to alleviate his symptoms. 188 The doctors all
agreed that the plaintiffs condition was directly related to his obesity
and that weight reduction, use of a nasal machine at night, and a surgi-
179 See, e.g., Hooper, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 929; Mont-Ron, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 1356-57; Sprad-
ley v. Custom Campers, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1232-33 (D. Kan. 1999).
199 See, e.g., Centura Health, 2007 WL 2788836, at *3 ("Sutton does not require that miti-
gating factors be considered when they are not used by plaintiff*); Williams, 2003 WL
22232835, at *5 ("The Sutton court explicitly stated that courts should not engage in
counter-factual hypothesizing, guessing whether a course of treatment would have allevi-
ated a plaintiffs disability."); Finical, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 1038 ("(A)n individualized inquiry
into the limitations faced by a claimant who does not use corrective devices is inconsistent
with an evaluation focusing on the limitations the claimant would face in a corrected slate.").
151 See, e.g., Monterroso, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 578; Hooper, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 929; Mont-lios,
111 F. Supp. 2d at 1356-57; Spradley, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1232-33.
182
	 F. Supp. 2d at 929.
las See id. (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482).
IPA Id. at 928.
las Id. at 929.
'88 Id.
187 111 F. Supp. 2cl at 1356-57.
ma Id. at 1356.
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cal procedure would all have helped mitigate his symptoms. 139 The
judge cited Sutton, but applied it to the plaintiffs situation despite the
fact that the plaintiff had not used 'mitigating measures as had the
plaintiffs in Sutton. 190
The broadening-of-Sutton analysis is inconsistent with the
ADAAA, 191 The district court judges who follow the broadening-of-
Sutton analysis extend Sutton's holding—that mitigating plaintiffs must
be considered in their mitigated states for the determination of "dis-
ability" —to nonmitigating plaintiffs to conclude that nonmitigating
plaintiffs must be considered in a hypothetical mitigated state)" In
essence, this analysis dictates that all plaintiffs, both mitigating and
nonmitigating, must be considered in a mitigated state. 193 The ADAAA
expressly overrules this conclusion by stating that whether an individual
is "substantially limited in a major life activity" shall be determined
without regard to mitigating measures. 194 And because the broadening-
of-Sutton analysis addresses only the construction of "disability," the
judges who used this analysis will need to develop an appropriate way to
address nonmitigating plaintiffs in the determination of whether a non-
mitigating plaintiff is a "qualified individual" after the ADAAA. 195
2. Erroneous "Qualified Individual" Analysis
In this analysis, district court judges have erroneously held that
plaintiffs who do not use mitigating measures that would alleviate their
symptoms are not "qualified individuals" under the ADA. 196 Other than
simply stating that the plaintiff cannot be a "qualified individual," these
cases have not provided any analysis to show which element of "quali-
fied individual" the plaintiff has failed to prove.'" This analysis origi-
nated from a 2000 decision by the U.S. District Court for the District of
189 Id.
190 See id.; see also Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475.
/ 9 / See infra notes 192-195 and accompanying text
192 See Monterroso, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 578; Hooper, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 929; Mont-Ras, 111
F. Supp. 2d at 1355-57; see also Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
199 See, e.g., Monterroso, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 578; Hooper, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 929; Mont-Ros,
111 F. Supp. 2d at 1356-57.
194 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(E) (i), 122 Stat. at 3556.
195 See id.; see also Monterroso, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 578; Hooper, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 929;
Mont-Ros, 111 F. Stipp. 2d at 1356-57.
199 See, e.g., Gibbon, 2008 1%1 5068966, at *5; Hewitt, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 189; Tangires, 79
F. Supp. 2d at 596.
197 See, e.g., Gibbon, 2008 WL 5068966, at *5; Hewitt, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 189; Tangires, 79
F. Supp. 2d at 596.
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Maryland in Tangires v. Johns Hopkins Hospital.' 98 Tangires relied on the
reasoning of Roberts u County of Fairfax, Virginia, a 1996 case in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia that was decided pre-
Sutton, but Tangires erroneously created a duty to mitigate that did not
exist in Roberts. 199 Essentially, the erroneous "qualified individual"
analysis is the result of a game of telephone, where Tangires miscon-
strued Roberts, and subsequent cases relied on this error."
In Roberts, the plaintiff suffered from mental and personal prob-
lems and was encouraged on numerous occasions by supervisors to ob-
tain treatment at a community health center and an employee assis-
tance program."' After initially seeking treatment, the plaintiff refused
further treatment for thirteen months, despite his supervisors' urg-
ing." After a number of performance problems, the plaintiff was de-
moted, and he sued, claiming he had clinical depression and was de-
moted in violation of the ADA." The court rejected the plaintiff's
claims, relying on an EEOC regulation that provides that if a plaintiff
rejects a reasonable accommodation, and as a result cannot perform
the essential functions of the position, the plaintiff is not considered a
"qualified individual."204 The court concluded that because the plaintiff
failed to accept the reasonable accommodations offered to him,
namely treatment for depression, he was not a "qualified individual"
under the ADA." This reasoning in Roberts is sound."
Tangires subsequently misconstrued the reasoning of Roberts. 207 In
Tangires, the plaintiff sued her employer for failure to provide a reason-
able accommodation for her disability. 208 The plaintiff suffered from
asthma, yet failed to use inhaled steroids as recommended by her doc-
tors." Relying mostly on the broadening-of-Sutton analysis, the court
1613 See 79 F. Supp. 2d at 596.
199 See Roberts, 937 F. Supp. at 548; Tangires, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 596.
200 See Roberts, 937 F. Supp. at 548; Tangires, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 596; see also Gibbon, 2008
WL 5068966, at *5; Sarkisian v. W. Va. Univ. Bd. of Governors, No. 1:05CV144, 2008 WL
901722, at *2 (N.D. W. Va. Mar. 31, 2008); Hewitt, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 189; Suja A. Thomas,
The Fallacy of Dispositive Procedure, 50 B.G. L. REV. 759, 767 (2009) (noting the game of tele-
phone).
201 937 F. Supp. at 543.
"2 Id.
493 Id. at 544.
404 Id. at 547-48; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(d) (2008).
2° 2 See Roberts, 937 F. Supp. at 548.
"6 See id.
497 See Tangires, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 596; see also Roberts, 937 F. Supp. at 548.
20°79 F. Supp. 2d at 589.
209 Id. at 595-96.
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concluded that the plaintiff was not "substantially limited in a major life
activity."210 In addition, the court included a single sentence that cited,
but misinterpreted, Roberts. "A plaintiff who does not avail herself of
proper treatment is not a 'qualified individual' under the ADA." 211 The
plaintiff in Roberts lost his case because' he failed to accept a reasonable
accommodation offered by his employers, 2 I 2 but the Tangires court erro-
neously translated that into a duty to mitigate by denying the plaintiff
ADA protection because she failed to accept treatment recommended
by her doctot: 213 Thus, the Tangires court placed a new burden on non-
mitigating plaintiffs to mitigate their impairments, therefore making it
more difficult for nonmitigating plaintiffs to be protected by the
ADA. 214
A number of district court judges from the Second and Fourth Cir-
cuits have found Tangires persuasive. 215 Like Tangires, these cases have
flatly stated that a piaintifrs failure to use available mitigating measures
means the plaintiff is not a "qualified individual. "216 Most cases have
relied on the broadening-of-Sutton analysis in conjunction with the er-
roneous Tangires analysis to address both the "disability" and "qualified
individual" elements. 217 But a recent case relies exclusively on the
Tangires error while explicitly rejecting the broadening-of-Sutton analy-
sis. 218 This exclusive reliance on the Tangires error creates just one more
mistake in the telephone chain. 219
Because the ADAAA addresses mitigating measures in the context
of "disability" it does not directly invalidate the Tangires analysis, which
219 See id.
211 See id. at 596.
112 See Roberts, 937 F. Stipp. at 548.
us See Tangires, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 596.
214 See id. at 595-96; see also, e.g., Gibbon, 2008 WI. 5068966, at *5; Sarkissian, 2008 WL
901722, at *2; Hewitt, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 189.
215 See, e.g., Gibbon, 2008 WL 5068966, at *5; Sarkissian, 2008 WL 901722, at *2; Hewitt,
185 F. Supp. Mat 189.
216 See, e.g., Gibbon, 2008 WL 5068966, at *5; Sarkissian, 2008 WI. 901722, at *2; Hewitt,
185 F. Supp. 2d at 189.
217 See, e.g., Sarkissian, 2008 WL 901722, at *2; Johnson v. Maynard, No. 01 Civ.
7393 (AKE), 2003 WI. 548754, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2003); Hewitt, 185 F. Supp. 2d at
188-89.
118 See Gibbon, 2008 WL 5068966, at *4-5. The district court judge in Gibbon found that
the plaintiff was not a "qualified individual" because he failed to treat his correctible im-
pairment with medication "without good cause." Id. at *5. Furthermore, the judge rejected
the plaintiffs argument that Sutton barred speculation as to whether the medication would
have corrected his impairment. Id. at *4.
219 See id.
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relies on whether a plaintiff is a "qualified individual." 220 But the reason-
ing underlying the Tangires analysis is faulty regardless of the ADAAA
because Tangires distorted the reasoning in Roberts to create a duty to
mitigate that does not exist under the ADA. 221 As a result, this analysis
should no longer be used by courts. 222 This Note provides a proposal
consistent with the ADAAA that allows courts to reach the desired out-
come without resorting to the faulty logic of the Tangiresanalysis. 22s
3. Purported Unreasonableness of Plaintiffs Decision Not to Mitigate
The language that many judges employed to justify the Duty to
Mitigate approach suggests that those judges felt that the nonmitigating
plaintiff's decision not to mitigate was unreasonable, and therefore that
providing ADA protection would be against public policy. 224 Ironically,
many of these decisions were not based on the "reasonable accommo-
dation" element of "qualified individual," which would seem to be a
natural place to consider unreasonable behavior. 225 Rather, these deci-
sions turned on either the definition of "disability" or the definition of
"qualified individual" with no mention of the "reasonable accommoda-
tion" element. 226
For example, in Hooper, the judge concluded that a nonmitigating
plaintiff with difficulty speaking was not "disabled" under the ADA. 227
The judge noted that the plaintiff "had an opportunity to mitigate her
symptoms and inexplicably did not do so." 228 After determining that
the plaintiff could have effectively treated her symptoms with Botox,
the judge stated that "there is no reason I can see why she could not
have been and was not taking injections of Botox . "229 The use of
"inexplicable" and "no reason" suggests that the judge felt that the
plaintiff's decision not to mitigate was unreasonable. 238 Similarly, in
22° See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 4(a), § 3(4) (E) (1), 122 Stat. at 3556; Tangires,
79 F. Supp. 2d at 596.
221 See Roberts, 937 F. Supp. at 548; Tangires, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 596.
222 See Roberts, 937 F. Stipp. at 548; Tangires, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 596.
223 See infra notes 239-345 and accompanying text.
444 See Gibbon, 2008 1.VL 5068966, at *4; Hooper, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 929; Tangires, 79 F.
Supp. 2d at 596.
225  See Gibbon, 2008 WI, 5068966, at *4; Hooper, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 929; Tangires, 79 F.
Supp. 2d at 596.
2 13 See Gibbon, 2008 '411_, 5068966, at *4; Hooper, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 929; Tangires,  79 F.
Supp. 2d at 596.
227 205 F. Supp. 2d at 929.
228 Id.
229 Id.
2 ''') Id.
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Gibbon, the judge concluded that a nonmitigating plaintiff was not pro-
tected by the ADA. 231 The judge stated that "it makes little sense to pro-
vide special accommodation for individuals who have access to treat-
ments that would ameliorate their impairments but who inexplicably
choose not to employ those treatments." 232
Likewise, in Tangires, the court concluded that a nonmitigating
plaintiff with asthma should be denied ADA protection. 233 When de-
scribing how the plaintiff refused her doctor's recommended treat-
ment, the court went out of its way to quote the doctor's statement that
when he counseled the plaintiff about the advantages of the proposed
medication, the plaintiff "almost went into a panic and developed very
childish behavior."234 Concluding that the plaintiffs asthma was cor-
rectable with medication and that the plaintiff "voluntarily refused the
recommended medication," the court denied the plaintiff ADA protec-
tion. 235 This language indicates that the judge concluded that the plain-
tiff acted not only unreasonably, but also in a manner that warrants no
protection under the ADA. 236 These cases wrongly focus on the plain-
tiffs actions without balancing the plaintiffs burden of mitigation with
the burden on the employer in accommodating an unmitigated plain-
tiff 237 The appropriate place to consider these burdens is in the inter-
pretation of "reasonable accommodation."238
V. PROPOSAL FOR DEFINING "REASONABLE" IN "REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION"
The ADAAA addresses mitigating measures in the context of the
construction of "disability." 239 According to the ADAAA, "Wile deter-
mination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life ac-
tivity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigat-
ing measures ...."240 lA Irutnough this statement was made with the ex-
231 2008 WL 5068966, at *4.
232 Id.
233 79 F. Su pp. 2d at 596.
234 Id.
295 Id.
236 See id.
237 See Gibbon, 2008 WL 5068966, at *4; Hooper, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 929; Tangires, 79 F.
Supp. 2d at 596.
238 See Debra Burke Be Malcolm Abel, Ameliorating Medication and ADA Protection: Use It
and Lose It or &flue It and Lose It?, 38 AM. Bus. Lj. 785, 813 (2001).
239 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110.325, sec. 4(a), § 3(4) (E) (i), 122
Stat. 3553, 3556 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(4) (E) (1) (West 2005 & Supp. 2B 2008)).
246 Id.
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press intent to overturn the holding in Sutton—which only addressed
mitigating plaintiffs—the statement is worded in such a way as to also
implicate nonmitigating plaintiffs. 2" This change in the ADAAA makes
clear that mitigating measures may never be considered when deter-
mining if an individual has a "disability."242 Nonetheless, it remains un-
clear how to address a plaintiff's failure to mitigate in the determina-
tion of the "qualified individual" analysis. 243
Because the ADAAA shifts the focus of the ADA inquiry from
whether the claimant has a "disability" to whether the claimant is a
"qualified individual," the proper treatment of nonmitigating plaintiffs
under the definition of "qualified individual" remains unanswered. 244
This Part argues that the failure to mitigate by a plaintiff must be con-
sidered when evaluating whether a plaintiff is a "qualified individual."245
Specifically, the actions of the nonmitigating plaintiff as they relate to
the employer's burden in accommodating are most appropriately ad-
dressed in the determination of "reasonable accommodation." 246 This
Note provides the first comprehensive proposal for addressing the
treatment of . nonmitigating plaintiffs after passage of the ADAAA. 2"
A. A Suggested Proposal: The "Substantially Less" Burden
Courts should balance the burdens of accomodation versus mitiga-
tion when addressing the "reasonable accommodation" element of
"qualified individual" with nonmitigating plaintiffs. 248 In order to make
out a prima facie claim that one is a "qualified individual," a plaintiff
must Show that "with or without reasonable accommodation, [the plain-
tiff] can perform the essential functions of the employment position
that such individual holds or desires." 249 In the case of nonmitigating
plaintiffs, the plaintiff should bear a small burden to reasonably mitigate
his condition before being allowed to require an employer to provide a
reasonable accommodation because plaintiffs should be given some in-
241 See id. sec. 2(b) (2), 122 Stat. at 3554; id. sec. 4(a), § 3(4) (E) (i), 122 Stat, at 3556.
242 See id. sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(E) (i), 122 Stat, at 3556.
20 See id.
244 See Daniel O'Toole & Jovita Foster, ADA Amendment Expands Protection, Mo. LAW.
WKLY., Oct. 13, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 19612997.
245 See infra notes 248-345 and accompanying text.
246 See Burke & Abel, supra note 238, at 813.
247 See infra notes 248-345 and accompanying text.
248 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a) (2000) (amended 2008); see, e.g., US Airways, Inc.
v, Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 400-01 (2002) (discussing the ordinary English meaning of the
word "reasonable" and factors that can make something unreasonable).
249 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a).
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centive to practice self-help before imposing a burden on their employ-
ers to accomodate.'" In order to show that an accommodation is rea-
sonable, the plaintiff should be required to establish that the burdens
imposed on the plaintiff to mitigate the effects of his disability are not
substantially less than the burdens imposed on the employer to accom-
modate the plaintiff's disability. 251 This will be referred to as the "sub-
stantially less" test to distinguish it from proposals by other commenta-
tors. 252
Consider the example of an employee with asthma who works as a
delivery truck driver. 255 Assume the asthma could be treated effectively
. with the use of medication via an inhaler, but the employee refuses to
use the medication. 254 Instead, the employee requests as an accommo-
dation a reduction in the number of daily deliveries to allow for fre-
quent breaks for the employee to recover from asthma attacks. 255 Here,
the burden on the employee to use medication is substantially less than
the burdens imposed on the employer to both reduce the plaintiffs
deliveries and shift that work to other employees. 256 As this illustration
demonstrates, the "substantially less" test places a small burden on the
plaintiff designed to capture outlier situations where the burden on the
plaintiff to mitigate is substantially less than the burden on the em-
ployer to accommodate. 257
250 See infra notes 263-272 and accompanying text.
251 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325,122 Stat. 3553. The use of
"substantially" in balancing tests has been implemented by courts in other contexts. See,
e.g., FED. R. Evtn. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presen-
tation of cumulative evidence.").
252
	 infra notes 253-345 and accompanying text.
253 A number of cases have addressed situations where plaintiffs have failed to mitigate
the symptoms of their asthma. See, e.g., Monterroso v. Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP, 591 F.
Supp. 2d 567,578 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (plaintiff refused her doctor's repeated recommenda-
tions that she use medication to manage her asthma); Tangires v.johns Hopkins Hosp., 79
F. Supp, 2d 587,595 (D. Md. 2000), aff'd, 230 F.3d 1359 (4th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff used only
one of two recommended medications to control her asthma).
259
	 supra note 253 and accompanying text.
255 For the purposes of this example, assume that the expense for the employer to
modify the driving deliveries (such as shifting this work to other employees) would not be
high enough to qualify as an "undue hardship," nor would the plaintiff's reduced schedule
allow the employer to show that the plaintiff was unable to perform the "essential func-
tions" of the employment position. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12111(10). Assume further
that the lower productivity of the employee after the proposed accommodation causes the
employer to experience reduced profitability or efficiency.
256 See infra notes 260-261 and accompanying text.
257 See supra notes 248-252 and accompanying text.
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A benefit of this test is that it allows the court to consider the rea-
sons underlying the plaintiff's behavior in relation to its impact on the
employer. 268 Rather than comparing the plaintiff to a reasonable per-
son, this is a subjective test. 269 When identifying the burdens on the
plaintiff to mitigate, the court should consider a number of factors, in-
cluding, but not limited to, the employee's justifications for not mitigat-
ing, doctors' recommendations for treatment, and side effects and risks
of proposed treatment. 260 When identifying the burdens on the em-
ployer to accommodate, the court should consider factors including,
but not limited to, the expense of the proposed accommodation, the
difficulty of the proposed accommodation, and the effect of the pro-
posed accommodation,on other employees and business operations. 261
The result of the "substantially less" test is that nonmitigating plain-
tiffs who can very easily mitigate their symptoms will not meet their
showing that an accommodation is "reasonable" if the accommodation
would place a significantly higher burden on the employer. On the
other hand, so long as the plaintiffs burden is not substantially less than
the burden on the employer, the plaintiff will meet the "reasonable ac-
commodation" element and therefore survive summary judgment on
that issue. 262
B. Proposal Consistent with the ADAAA, Barnett, and Public Policy
The "substantially less" test is consistent with the intent and lan-
guage of the ADAAA. 263 Specifically, this test balances two seemingly
conflicting congressional intents: to reverse the disadvantage Sutton
placed on mitigating plaintiffs, and to provide broad coverage to all
disabled individuals. 2  The ADAAA addressed mitigating measures
with the express purpose to overturn Sutton. 265 Legislative history shows
258 See infra notes 252-257 and accompanying text.
259 See infra notes 260-261 and accompanying text.
250 For a discussion of whether economic need should be a factor considered in rela-
tion to mitigating measures, see generally Christine M. Tomko, Note, The Economically Dis-
advantaged and the ADA: Why Economic Need Should Factor into the Mitigating Measu res Disability
Analysis, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1033 (2002).
281 In addition to considering the factors taken into account for an '`undue hardship"
analysis, the factors considered in the "substantially less" test encompass a broader range of
factors consistent with Barnett. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 12111(a) (10)(B) (West 2005 & Supp. 2B 2008); Barnett, 535 U.S. at 400-0l.
252 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(A), 122 Stat. at 3555; Barnett,
535 U.S.' at 400-01.
285 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 4(a), § 3(4) (E) (i), 122 Stat. at 3556.
254 See id. sec. 2(a) (4). 122 Stat. at 3553; id. sec. 4(a), § 3(4) (A), 122 Stat. at 3555.
255 Id. sec. 2(b) (2), 122 Stat. at 3554.
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that this change was designed to prevent mitigating plaintiffs who
worked to improve their situation from being excluded from ADA pro-
tection. 266 In all five of the illustrative cases that the House of Represen-
tatives Committee on Education and Labor Report used to demon-
strate the injustice of Sutton, the plaintiffs who were denied coverage
had mitigated their impairments. 267 Conversely, it was not intended
that nonmitigating plaintiffs would be encouraged to forgo self-help in
the treatment of their impairments in order to obtain ADA coverage. 268
On the other hand, Congress clearly intended for the ADAAA to
result in broad coverage for Americans with disabilities. 269 The ADAAA
states that Congress intends for the primary focus of ADA cases to be
not whether the plaintiff is "disabled," but "whether entities covered
under the ADA have complied with their obligations." 270 By placing a
modest burden on plaintiffs to mitigate, the "substantially less" test re-
duces the incentives for plaintiffs not to mitigate consistent with con-
gressional intent. 271 And by only capturing outlier situations with the
"substantially less" language, this test will allow the majority of nontniti-
gating plaintiffs to survive summary judgment, which is consistent with
the purpose of the ADA to provide broad coverage to disabled Ameri-
cans. 272
This proposal is also consistent with the limited guidance that the
2002 case US Airways, Inc. V. Bartlett provides for the determination of
"reasonable accommodation."2" The Court in Barnett indicated that in
order for a plaintiff to defeat a defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment, the plaintiff "need only show that an 'accommodation' seems
reasonable on its face ...."274 But the Court did not define the term
"reasonable."276 The Court did indicate that the correct interpretation
of "reasonable accommodation" lies somewhere between the extremes
of meaning simply "effective accommodation" and the redundant mir-
266 See H.R. REP. No. 110-730, pt. 1, at 15-16 (2008); id. pt. 2, at 10; 154 CONG. REC.
S8346 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008) (statement of the managers).
267 See H.R. REP. No. 110-730, pt. 1, at 15-16.
266 See id. pt. 2, at 10. Indeed, that result would create perverse incentives for disabled
individuals to not seek to improve their conditions through self-help. See id.; supm note 126
and accompanying text.
262 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 4(a), § 3(9) (A), 122 Scat. at 3555.
276 Id. sec. 2 (b) (5), 122 Stat. at 3554.
271 See supra notes 264-268 and accompanying text.
272 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 4(a), § 3(4) (A), 122 Stat, at 3555.
272 See 535 U.S. at 400-01.
274 See it at 401.
272 See id. at 400-01.
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ror image of the term "undue hardship: "276 The plaintiff argued that
"reasonable accommodation" meant only "effective accommodation,"
otherwise "reasonable accommodation" would simply be a mirror im-
age of "undue hardship." 277 Rejecting this argument, the Court noted
that an effective accommodation may be unreasonable because of fac-
tors other than its impact on business operations, which is the consid-
eration under "undue hardship." 278 In the case of nonmitigating plain-
tiffs, the decision of the plaintiff not to mitigate should weigh in courts'
reasonableness analysis. 279
In addition, this proposal is consistent with public policy and the
practical burdens that courts face on limitations of time and re-
sources. 280 Plaintiffs should be required to help themselves to a modest
degree before requiring accommodation from their employers in order
to prevent unwanted disincentives to mitigate. 281 The Supreme Court
in Sutton and the district court judges in addressing nonmitigating
plaintiffs sought to interpret the definition of "disability" narrowly in
order to stem the tide of ADA cases. 282 Courts working in a post-
ADAAA world will look for ways to contain the increase of additional
ADA cases that will be brought. 288 The "substantially less" test provides
a practical way for courts to dismiss on summary judgment cases where
the plaintiff has not met a modest burden of self-help, therefore allow-
ing judges to focus on the legitimate cases brought by the plaintiffs that
Congress intended the ADAAA to cover. 284
C. Analysis and Critique of Other Proposals
Prior to the passage of the ADAAA, various proposals had been
made regarding the proper treatment of nonmitigating plaintiffs. 289
276 See id. at 400.
2" Id. at 399.
278 See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 400-01.
279 See id.
2  See Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can Employ-
ment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 307,
358 (2001): Long, supra note 11, at 228.
281 See H.R. REP. No. 110-730, pt. 2, at 10.
282 See Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 280, at 358; Long, supra note 11, at 228-29.
286 See Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 280, at 358; Long, supra note 11, at 228-29.
284 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 2(a) (4), 122 Stat. at 3553; id. sec. 4(s),
§ 3(4)(A), 122 Stat. at 3555.
266 See Burke & Abel, supra note 238, at 813; Joshua C. Dickinson, Will the Supreme Court
Allow Employers to Consider Reasonable Mitigating Measures Not Presently Utilized by Employees
When Determining Whether a Disability" Exists Under Section A of the ADA?, 68 UMKC L. Rev.
389, 409 (2000); Jill Elaine Hasday, Mitigation and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 103
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Most advocated weighing the reasonableness of the nonmitigating
plaintiff's decision not to mitigate, 286 although a few argued that a
nonmitigating plaintiffs decision not to mitigate cannot be considered
at all. 287 An analysis of these arguments highlights why the proposal
suggested in this Note provides a preferable test. 288
Commentators have proposed various tests addressing the reason-
ableness of a nonmitigating plaintiffs decision not to mitigate. 289 One
proposal suggests allowing the employer, after the nonmitigating plain-
tiff has met his prima facie case, to show that the use of mitigating
measures by the plaintiff "is a more reasonable alternative to an ac-
commodation by the employer.” 290 This proposal will be referred to as
the employee/employer balancing test. Others argue that a plaintiff
seeking ADA protection should have a duty to mitigate that requires us-
ing mitigating measures that could reduce the need for an accommoda-
tion and that a reasonable person in the same circumstances would
use. 291 This proposal will be referred to as the employee/reasonable
person balancing test.
Mien. L. Itcv. 217, 219 (2004); Lisa E. Key, VOluntary Disabilities and the ADA: A Reasonable
Interpretation of "Reasonable Accommodations," 48 HASTINGS L.J. 75, 96 (1996); Shaw, supra
note 39, at 1987.
238 See, e.g., Burke & Abel, supra note 238, at 813; Hasday, supra note 285, at 219; Key,
supra note 285, at 96.
282 See Shaw, supra note 39, at 1984-87; see also Dickinson, supra note 285, at 409. Shaw ar-
gued that any proposal to take into account a nonmitigating plaintiff's reasons for failing to
mitigate was inconsistent with Sutton's prohibition on speculation and Barnett. Sec Shaw, supra
note 39, at 2034-36, 2039. As discussed previously, however, the ADAAA requires speculation
in some cases, which overrides Sutton's prohibition on speculation. See ADA Amendments Act
of 2008, sec. 4(a), § 3(4) (E) (i), 122 Stat. at 3556; Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S.
471, 482-83 (1999), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325,
122 Stat. 3553. In addition, Barnett leaves open the door for factors other than impact on the
employer's business operations to be taken into account in the "reasonable accommodation"
analysis. See 535 U.S. at 400-01; Shaw, supra note 39, at 2036 n.333.
288 See infra notes 289-345 and accompanying text.
289 See, e.g., Burke & Abel, supra note 238, at 814; Hasday, supra note 285, at 219; Key,
supra note 285, at 96.
290 See Burke & Abel, supra note 238, at 817. Burke and Abel advocate an approach that
balances the burden on the employer to accommodate against the burden on the em-
ployee to mitigate. Id. at 814. By placing the burden on the employer to prove that the use
of mitigating measures by the employee would be more reasonable than accommodation
by the employer, this proposal denies ADA protection to an employee even where the em-
ployer can prove that mitigation by the employee is only slightly more reasonable than
accommodation by the employer. See id. at 816-17. This excludes too many plaintiffs from
ADA protection. See infra notes 295-345 and accompanying text.
291 See Hasday, supra note 285, at 219; Key, supra note 285, at 96-97. Hasday proposes
that plaintiffs should have the same duty to mitigate that a reasonable person in the same
circumstances would have and that could reduce the need for an accommodation. See
Hasday, supra note 285, at 219. Hasday uses the proposed duty of reasonable mitigation to
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The benefit of both these tests is that they seek to alleviate the
burden on the employer to accommodate if the employee's decision
not to mitigate is unreasonable. 292 These tests tend to reference strong
public policy reasons for placing a burden on impaired employees to
improve their situations. 293 For example, one commentator argues that
employees may not have the incentive to mitigate their impairments if
their employers must make an accommodation regardless of the em-
ployee's actions. 294
The problem with both these proposals is that they are overly ex-
clusive, in that they exclude too many plaintiffs from ADA coverage in
middle ground cases. 295 In the employee/reasonable person balancing
test, if an employee has taken some steps to mitigate his impairment
but is determined not to have taken all steps that a reasonable person
in the same circumstances would have taken, then the employee is ex-
cluded from full protection of the ADA. 296 For example, what if a plain-
tiff takes one of two recommended drugs, and it is determined that a
reasonable person would have taken both? 297 The plaintiff is denied
full coverage under the employee/reasonable person balancing test. 298
It is also problematic that the employee/reasonable person balancing
test does not directly take into account the burden on the employer. 299
The employee/employer balancing test also is overly exclusive because
the plaintiff is denied coverage even if the burden on the plaintiff is
allow a judge to consider a wide range of reasons why a nonmitigating employee may
choose not to mitigate, including risk, difficulty, or expense. See id. at 239. Similarly. Key
recommends that an employee be required to take similar steps to mitigate his disability
that a reasonable person would take in the same circumstances before requiring an em-
ployer to provide an accommodation. See Key, supra note 285, at 96-99. If it would be rea-
sonable for the plaintiff to mitigate. then the employer would be required to provide an
accommodation only to the extent required given the mitigated state of the employee. Id.
at 97. As an exception, Key indicates that if it would be reasonable for the employee to
mitigate. but a "viable accommodation" could be made, the employee could forego mitiga-
tion and pay the cost of the accommodation by the employer. Id.
292 See Burke & Abel, supra note 238, at 814; Hasday, supra note 285, at 239; Key, supra
note 285, at 97.
299 See Hasday, supra note 285, at 224; Key, supra note 285, at 84-85. For a proposal of
how the rule of avoidable consequences from tort law could influence the treatment of
non mitigating plaintiffs, see Key, supra note 285, at 98-103.
294 Key, supra note 285, at 84-85.
295 See infra notes 323-345 and accompanying text.
296 See Hasday, supra note 285, at 219; Key, supra note 285, at 97.
297 See Tangires, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 595 (plaintiff occasionally used one of two drugs rec-
ommended by her doctor but refused use of the second drug).
299 See Hasday, supra note 285, at 219; Key, supra note 285, at 97.
299 See Hasday, supra note 285, at 239; Key, supra note 285, at 97.
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slightly less than the burden on the employer. 300 These proposals fail to
fulfill the ADAAA's purpose to "provide broad coverage" to individuals
with disabilities."'
D. Hypothetical Cases
The following illustrative cases are designed to compare and con-
trast the "substantially less" test with other proposals, as well as high-
light how the "substantially less" test is consistent with the ADAAA. 302
L Easier Cases: Large Difference Between Burdens
Consider a hypothetical where the plaintiff suffers from asthma,
which is aggravated by a move to a new office within the same building
that has a stronger and colder air flow from the air system. 303 The pur-
pose of the move was to have the plaintiff's work group in proximity to
new team members, and moving the entire group to another location
or modifying the air system would be expensive. 304 The plaintiffs doc-
tor advises her to use two medications to treat her asthma, both of
which should almost fully treat her symptoms despite the changed air
flow. 305 The medications have minimal side effects and are easy to ad-
minister. 306 The plaintiff uses one of the medications occasionally but
refuses to use the other based on an incorrect belief that it will ad-
versely impact another, unrelated impairment, despite assurances from
her doctor to the contrary. 307 After the plaintiff experiences several ex-
tended absences from work due to complications from her asthma, the
employer fires the employee. 308
Under the "substantially less" test, the burden on the plaintiff to
mitigate her symptoms by using both medications is substantially less
than the burden on the employer to pay to modify the air system or to
move the plaintiffs work group to another location in the building. 309
500 See Burke & Abel. supra note 238, at 816-17.
3°1 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 4(a), § 3(4) (A), 122 Stat. at 3555.
3°2 See id. sec. 2(a) (4)—(5), 122 Stat. at 3553; id. sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(A), 122 Stat. at 3555.
303 This hypothetical is based largely on the facts from Tangires. See 79 F. Supp. 2d at
589-92.
304 See supra note 303.
305 See supra note 303.
306 See supra note 303.
307 See supra note 303.
sm In Tangires, the plaintiff was placed on medical layoff rather than fired. 79 F. Supp.
2d at 591-92.
909 See supra notes 248-261 and accompanying text.
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Therefore, the accommodation is not reasonable, and the plaintiff is
not a "qualified individual" and may not obtain ADA protection.'" This
result intuitively makes sense because the plaintiff should be required
to take simple steps to mitigate her disability before obligating her em-
ployer to make a much more difficult accommodation to her unmiti-
gated disability.'" This situation is exactly the outlier type of case that
the "substantially less" test is designed to capture and exclude from
ADA coverage." 2
Similarly, under the employee/reasonable person balancing test,
the plaintiff would be denied full ADA coverage.'" A reasonable per-
son would use both of the medications recommended by the doctor in
this situation, but the plaintiff refused to do so. 314 Likewise, under the
employee/employer balancing test, the employer would be able to
show that it is more reasonable for the employee to take mitigating
measures than for the employer to accommodate. 315
With changed facts that elevate the burden on the plaintiff and
lower the burden on the employer, all three tests would allow the plain-
tiff past summary judgment. 316 In the original hypothetical, assume that
the employer could easily modify the force and air flow in the plaintiff's
new office.'" Assume also that although' the second medication is rec-
ommended as the next treatment option for the plaintiff's asthma, the
medication has a 25 percent chance of seriously negatively affecting the
plaintiff's unrelated impairment. 318 Under the "substantially less" test
and the two balancing tests, the plaintiff would survive summary judg-
ment.'" The plaintiff's risk of using the second medication is not sub-
stantially less than the burden on the employer to modify the air flow. 920
A jury could find that a reasonable person in the same situation as the
plaintiff would elect to forgo the second medication, so the plaintiff
310
	 supra notes 248-261 and accompanying text.
5" See Key; supra note 285, at 81-85.
312 See supra notes 248-261 and accompanying text.
313 See Hasday, supra note 285, at 219; Key, supra note 285, at 97.
3" See Hasday, supra note 285, at 219; Key, supra note 285, at 97.
515 See Burke & Abel, supra note 238, at 816-17. ,
316
	 id.; Hasday, supra note 285, at 219; Key, supra note 285, at 97; see also supra notes
248-261 and accompanying text.
017 This hypothetical is based loosely on the facts from Tangires, but wittfa number of
changes. See 79 F. Supp. 2d at 589-92.
318 See supra note 317.
519 See Burke & Abel, supra note 238, at 816-17; Hasday, supra note 285, at 219; Key, su-
pra note 285, at 97; see also supra notes 248-261 and accompanying text.
325 See supra notes 248-261 and accompanying text.
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would survive the employee/reasonable person balancing test. 321 Fi-
nally, a jury could find that accommodation by the employer would be
more reasonable than the plaintiff using the second medication, so the
employee would survive the employee/employer balancing test. 322
2. Middle Ground Case: Almost Equal Burdens
The following hypothetical is designed to highlight the situations
where the "substantially less" test and the other proposals diverge. 323
Consider the prior hypothetical, but with some changed facts. 324 In-
stead of moving the plaintiff's entire work group with some expense,
the plaintiff could switch offices with one other employee and still have
an office on the same floor as her work group, but down the hal1. 323
The two offices are comparable except for the difference in air flow. 326
The plaintiff now regularly uses the first medication recommended by
her physician but refuses to use the second medication because of her
previous unsubstantiated concerns. 327
In this hypothetical, the burden on the plaintiff is moderately low,
but the burden on the employer is likewise moderately low. 323 The ADA
imposes a duty of reasonable accommodation on employers, and the
ADAAA stresses the need for "broad coverage" under the ADA. 329 Con-
sequently, the presumption should be toward coverage except in cases
where the burden on plaintiffs to mitigate is substantially less than the
burden on employers to acconunodate. 330 Under the "substantially less"
test, the burden on the employee to mitigate would not be substantially
less than the burden on the employer to accommodate. 331 Therefore,
the plaintiff would (and should) survive summary judgment. 332
321 See Hasday, supra note 285, at 219; Key, supra note 285, at 97.
322 Sec Burke & Abel, supra note 238, at 816-17.
323 See id.; Hasday, supra note 285, at 219; Key, supra note 285, at 97; supra notes 248-
261  and accompanying text.
324 This hypothetical is based loosely on the facts from Tangires, but with a number of
changes. See 79 F. Supp. 2d at 589-92.
323 See supra note 324.
32° See supra note 324.
327 See supra note 324.
329 See supra notes 260-261 and accompanying text.
329 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 2(a) (1), 122 Stat. at 3553; id. sec. 9(a),
§ 3(4) (A), 122 Stat. at 3555; 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (5) (A).
3" See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 2(a) (1), 122 Stat. at 3553; id. sec. 4(a),
§ 3(4) (A), 122 Stat. at 3555; 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (5) (A).
331 See supra notes 248-261 and accompanying text.
332 See supra notes 248-261 and accompanying text.
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Conversely, the employee/reasonable person balancing test im-
poses a duty on a nonmitigating plaintiff to mitigate to the extent that a
reasonable person would in the same circumstances. 333 This test does
not recognize the distinction between this and the prior hypothetical
because it does not take into account the plaintiffs burden compared
to the employer's burden.'" Here, the plaintiff still fails to act as a rea-
sonable person would and therefore would be denied ADA coverage
under the employee/reasonable person balancing test. 335 Although
this test is consistent with the congressional intent to only help mitigat-
ing plaintiffs, it does not fulfill the congressional intent to provide
broad coverage under the ADA. 336
The employee/employer balancing test raises different problems
in this situation. 337 This test places the burden on the employer to show
that mitigation by the plaintiff would be a more reasonable alternative
than accommodation by the employer. "8 In a case where the burdens
are exactly equal, the employer would fail to meet this burden. 339 Al-
though the facts of this hypothetical suggest that the burdens on the
plaintiff and employer may be relatively equal, significantly more fact
finding would be required before such a determination could be
made."' In close cases, therefore, the employee/employer balancing
test does not reach a clear decision, nor does it promote judicial effi-
ciency or consistency."' In contrast, the "substantially limits" test re-
solves this problem clearly in favor of the employee, which is consistent
with the ADAAA's mandate for broad coverage. 342
The "substantially less" test strikes the appropriate balance be-
tween congressional intent to aid only mitigating plaintiffs and the in-
tent to provide broad coverage to all disabled individuals. 343 This test' is
similarly consistent with the guidance Barnett provides on the appropri-
ate boundaries for the "reasonable accommodation" definition. 344 And
933 See Hasday, supra note 285, at 219; Key, supra note 285, at 97.
334 See Hasday, supra note 285, at 219; Key, supra note 285, at 97.
"s See Hasday, supra note 285, at 219; Key, supra note 285, at 97.
396 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 2(a) (4), 122 Stat. at 3553; id. sec. 4(a),
§ 3(4) (A), 122 Stat. at 3555; Hasday, supra note 285, at 219; Key, supra note 285, at 97.
337 See Burke & Abel, supra note 238, at 816-17.
336 See id.
336 See id.
340 See supra notes 260-261 and accompanying text.
341 See Burke & Abel, supra note 238, at 816-17.
342 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 2(a)(1), 122 Stat. at 3553; id, sec. 4(a),
§ 3(4)(A), 122 Stat. at 3555.
"3 See id. sec. 2(a) (4), 122 Stat. at 3553; id. sec. 4(a), § 3(4) (A), 122 Stat. at 3555.
344 ,See 535 U.S. at 400.
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as demonstrated by the hypothetical cases, this test best complies with
the spirit and letter of the ADAAA and Barnett when compared to other
proposals. 345
CONCLUSION
The ADAAA has resulted in dramatic changes to the ADA that will
push the question of how to treat nonmitigating plaintiffs to the fore-
front of litigation. Most pre-ADAAA cases were determined on the issue
of "disability," but after the significant expansion of the interpretation of
this term in the ADA.AA, courts will be forced to grapple with the uncer-
tainty of defining what constitutes a "reasonable accommodation." Both
Congress and the Supreme Court have provided limited guidance on
the interpretation of "reasonable accommodation." In addition, the
current confusion of lower courts over the correct way to address a
plaintiff's failure to mitigate must be addressed, particularly because
none of the courts' reasoning is valid after the ADAAA. Requiring the
plaintiff to establish that the burdens imposed on him to mitigate the
effects of his disability are not substantially less than the burdens im-
posed on the employer to accommodate the plaintiffs disability is an
appropriate way to show that an accommodation is reasonable. This ap-
proach provides guidance on the proper treatment of nonmitigating
plaintiffs that is consistent with the legislative intent, case law, and public
policy.
REAGAN S. BISSONNETTE
"5 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 2(a) (4), 122 Stat. at 3553; id. sec. 4(a),
§ 3(4)(A), 122 Stat. at 3555; Barnett, 535 U.S. at 900.
